POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR FIRE SERVICE OPERATIONS
DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCES

EXECUTIVE ANALYSIS OF FIRE SERVICE OPERATIONS
IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research was to identify the principal causes of civil disorder, and to develop policies and procedures that facilitate safe and effective fire and EMS operations under such conditions. The research also sought to determine how fire and police could best coordinate their efforts.

The problem is how to provide for fire and EMS operations in areas involved in civil disorder. The tactics which many protestors are employing, and the actions they are frequently taking pose a significant risk to emergency responders.

Action research methodology was employed to answer four research questions: What is civil disorder, and what are the most frequent causes of civil disturbances that result in fire suppression or emergency medical services response? What policies should be in place to provide fire service command officers a frame work within which to operate? What procedures should be employed by fire fighters and emergency medical personnel when responding into areas involved in civil disorder to minimize risk to themselves and the public? At what level should fire and police coordinate operations and interact with one another in areas involved in civil disorder?

The procedure used in this research involved a literature review of applicable material, a review of various agency's operating policies and procedures, and the collection of data from a survey measuring fire service experience with civil disorder and level of preparation sent to sixty-four western municipal fire departments serving populations of 100,000 or greater.

The major findings were that communications, coordination and sharing of
operational intelligence with police is an essential component in successful operations in the civil disorder environment. A common finding was a lower level of operational preparedness as compared with certain types of fire, rescue, and hazardous materials procedures. The research showed that communities which have experienced large scale civil disturbances are usually the best prepared.

The recommendations based on this research are to develop and maintain an agreement with local law enforcement that defines responsibilities, and establishes how inter-agency communication will occur. In addition, the research supported the need for a well developed policy that places limits on fire service involvement during civil disturbances, and establishes organizational objectives and priorities in assigning resources. The research also identified the need for set operational procedures that provide guidance for line level companies.
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INTRODUCTION

The problems that this research sought to address are those difficulties and hazards experienced by fire service and EMS personnel when operating in areas involved in civil disorder. The unique demands these events place on emergency responders require special policies and procedures that provide guidance, and help increase the likelihood of safe operations and successful incident mitigation efforts.

The purpose of this research was to develop a set of policies and procedures for fire and EMS operations during periods of civil disorder. The research also sought to identify the causes of civil unrest, and determine the appropriate level of interaction, information share and support in the field between police and fire service agencies.

The development of a clear definition for "civil disturbance" was heavily influenced by some of the initial research, and then refined for the purposes of this Applied Research Project. The definition is as follows: A Civil Disturbance is the intentional disobedient behavior by a group of people in violation of public policy, laws or regulations, that results in some form of community disruption. For the purpose of this paper, the terminology "civil disturbance" and "civil disorder," should be considered interchangeable.

Action research methodology was used to develop a comprehensive policy and
set of standard operating procedures to provide guidance for fire suppression and emergency medical services companies operating in areas involved in civil disorder. The following research questions were applied to the information and data obtained in the course of this project:

1) What is civil disorder, and what are the most frequent causes of civil disturbances that result in fire suppression or emergency medical services response?

2) What policies should be in place to provide fire service command officers a framework within which to operate?

3) What procedures should be employed by fire fighters and emergency medical personnel when responding into areas involved in civil disorder to minimize risk to themselves and the public?

4) At what level should fire and police coordinate operations and interact with one another in areas involved in civil disorder?

Information was obtained from the literature review and various operating procedures acquired from a number of fire departments. Survey results were also used to assist in answering the research questions and in developing a set of policies and procedures.

**BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE**

The City of Eugene, Oregon has a long history of civil unrest and protests that date back to the 1960's when large scale demonstrations against the Viet Nam War and what was viewed as the "establishment" took place. Home to the University of Oregon,
Eugene has experienced its share of social conflict which has included the fire bombing and burning of the ROTC building on the University campus in 1972, and bomb damage to several other University of Oregon buildings associated with other protests of the time. (Dorsch 1999)

Fortunately most of today's protest on the University of Oregon's campus are less extreme and focus on a variety of less significant issues. For example, on May 19, 1999, thirty-one students were arrested after staging a sit-in outside of the University President's office. "The sit-in grew out of a debate about racism in a public policy class of about sixty students that became so heated, one student sent anonymous, threatening e-mails to several classmates." (Huntington 1999)

Although the fire department did not respond to this specific incident, fire and EMS response has occurred in the past to provide fire suppression, emergency medical treatment, and to extricate protestors who have secured themselves in some manner to stationary objects. The goal for the fire department has been to enter the area after it has been secured by police, and then conduct operations in a manner that provides for everyone's safety including emergency services workers, bystanders, and the protestors themselves.

Today, civil disorder still frequents the University of Oregon campus and surrounding areas, however more recently, disruptive behavior associated with the university has more frequently taken the form of large out-of-control parties rather than students pursuing a political agenda. Never the less, these behavioral problems have resulted in a number of incidents where police field forces were deployed to restore order. In one such event occurring in 1998, police were deployed in a field force to
control a riotous crowd when a fire broke out in student housing. Upon arrival, one of the responding fire apparatus was damaged from debris thrown from a crowd of disorderly students as the first in fire company approached the scene.

Although the campus area still poses a level of concern for Eugene officials, the City has also experienced an increase in off campus political protests. These protests are most commonly associated with radical environmentalism and a number of these protests have resulted in arrests, property damage, and injuries resulting from violence.

While crowd control and law enforcement activities associated with behavioral problems are clearly a police function, the collateral damage to property and the injuries sustained by protestors, bystanders and police officers, frequently necessitate a fire service response and the commitment of resources.

Although there have been a number of such incidents over the past few years, the most notorious one occurred on June 1, 1997, and involved protestors scaling a construction fence, and then climbing and securing themselves to about a dozen trees scheduled to be removed. When police, with help from firefighters and department aerial apparatus, attempted to forcefully remove the protestors a riot broke out from a crowd of on lookers. As a result, a number of people sustained injuries including several police officers. Although the event took place over two years ago, the City of Eugene, a number of police officers and one fire lieutenant are now being sued for their actions during the incident. (Bishop 1999)

Several subsequent tree sitting incidents have fortunately been resolved somewhat more favorably, however, potential problems still exist. Other protests
requiring joint police and fire intervention have been generated by the construction of the Hyundai computer chip processing plant, the opening of a new Nike athletic store, and a variety of political issues that have resulted in protest, property damage, and injuries.

In addition to the university students and the radical environmentalists, there is another group that some consider more insidious, and may pose a greater threat to the community and its public safety responders. This group, which proclaim themselves to be anarchists, are described as, "Eugene's newest and hottest political movement." (Hartman 1999)

Police say they made a mistake in October (1998) when they figured that a planned protest at the new Nike store would be like many others -- a few people with signs. Instead, anarchists trashed the store." (Hartman 1999)

John Zerzan, "an anarchist author who corresponds with the Unabomber and has visited him in jail," agreed with a group of panelists on public television that "property damage -- if it serves a higher purpose -- isn't violent." This same panel went on to support the "trashing of the Nike store and the arson fire that destroyed part of the Vail, Colorado ski resort." (Hartman 1999)

In June 1999, an anarchist parade that started out with the burning of the American Flag, escalated into a rampage of violence in downtown Eugene. A number of police officers and rioters were injured with a few being transported to the hospital, and some significant property damage occurred to surrounding businesses and
vehicles. Police ultimately used pepper spray and CS (tear) gas to break up the melee.

(Hartman 1999)

Following this event, Eugene Mayor Jim Torrey stated that, "we have a group of people who believe they are above the law taking actions that are without regard for the safety of all of the citizens, themselves included." (Neville 1999)

From these past experiences and police intelligence indicating future problems associated with some of these radical groups, Eugene police and fire officials have identified the need to review their response procedures and operating policies, and look for better strategies to safely and effectively maintain order. The goal is to maintain order while allowing individual's the right to exercise free speech.

This research project was prompted by a realization that Eugene’s Fire Department needs a better assessment of civil disturbance and the risk it poses to the community, and develop better operational policies and procedures. The Community Risk Assessment concept was discussed in the Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management course taught at the National Fire Academy, and was included in course units number four and number six. This course was attended in May of 1999.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature reviewed for this research was taken from a variety of sources including fire service publications, local newspaper articles, periodical literature, various
fire service agency operating procedures, a federal government study on civil unrest, books, and previous fire service research. The variety and scope of literature accessed in the literature review helped provide a broad perspective on the critical elements that should exist in fire service civil disorder policies and procedures.

To aid in assimilation, the acquired information was subdivided into four main sections which followed the research questions listed.

**What is civil disorder, and what are the most frequent causes that result in fire suppression or emergency medical services response?**

When assessing a particular threat in the community it is important for fire service command officers to adequately understand the extent of the risk, or problem they are attempting to assess, and to determine the causes that create the problem. This first research question seeks to define civil disorder, and then identify the most frequent causes. By understanding the chain of events that cause disturbances, fire service command officers can better prepare for operations in such an environment.

Regardless of the cause for conflict, civil disorder is manifest into one of two distinct forms of civil protest. The two forms are *Civil Disobedience* and *Rioting*. (Conant 1971, pp.15)

"Civil Disobedience, unlike Rioting, is open and intentional violation of public policy, law, or regulation for the sake of principle or for the welfare of the community. The disobedience may take the form of doing what is prohibited or of failing to do what is required; but disobedience is a premeditated act..." (Conant 1971, pp.15) Thus acts of civil disobedience are usually planned, and the participants have a preconceived
sense of their limitations. These types of activities tend to be less violent in nature, and pose less of a threat to firefighters and emergency medical services workers.

Rioting on the other hand, "... is a spontaneous outburst of group violence characterized by excitement mixed with rage. Riots are usually directed against alleged perpetrators of injustice or gross misuses of political power. The typical rioter has no premeditated purpose, plan, or direction, although systematic looting, arson, and attack on persons usually occur once a riot is under way." (Conant 1971, pp. 22)

"The news media are an important factor in influencing an already tense situation by often inadvertently acting as provocateur." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 25)

"For example, during the 1992 trial of the four (police) officers accused in the Rodney King beating, (Los Angeles, California) the television news media continually aired the videotape showing King being beaten by police officers while lying on the ground, apparently helpless." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 25)

"Tensions that existed in these climates undoubtedly had a profound impact on the public's perception of and reaction to the videotaped beating and on the nature of the LAPD command staff's response to the lawlessness that followed the jury's 'not guilty' verdicts." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 11)

Captain Mark McLees, of the Syracuse, New York Fire Department, observed that, "In today's socio-economic climate, more and more demonstrations are likely to occur in any size municipality. With events such as an upcoming national election; strained race relations; and the day-in, day-out arguments over abortion, there is no lack of topics to rally around. The so-called 'Generation X' is disenchanted and looking for causes." (McLees 1996) These observations followed a call where Captain McLees'
fire company was dispatched to assist police in extricating a group of anti-fur protesters who had attached themselves to a folding security gate using off-the-shelf U-shaped bicycle locks and handcuffs. (McLees 1996)

Although there are a number of individual causes attributed to civil disorder, the Task Force on Civil Unrest asserts that, "it is becoming increasingly apparent that the key factor in actual riotous confrontation is the community's relationship to law enforcement and other local officials." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 27)

It was interesting to note that the police and fire chiefs who comprised the Task Force on Civil Unrest were exclusively from large metropolitan areas across the United States. Although civil disorder and rioting can occur anywhere, it appears to be mostly an urban problem.

By developing a better understanding of civil disorder, identifying the different types and their causes, the task of creating policies and procedures to provide direction for fire and EMS operations becomes better defined.

**What policies should be in place to provide fire service command officers a framework within which to operate?**

Policies provide fire service decision makers the parameters in which to operate, and the framework within which decisions can be made and assignments given. In the area of civil disturbances, a clear and unambiguous policy helps establish operational parameters so that the decision of how far intervention will be taken is decided in a clinical setting prior to the occurrence of an emergency. A policy is defined in *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* as, "a method or course of action
adopted by a government, business organization, etc., designed to influence and
determine decisions.” (Davies 1972)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Most of the operating policies and procedures reviewed in this research called for
the establishment of some order of strategic priorities. The Huntington Beach Fire
Department provided a good simple order which is presented below as an example.

A Place the highest priorities on firefighter safety and prevent the incident from reaching
catastrophic proportions.® (Huntington Beach Fire Department 1998)

• Prioritize incidents and mitigate the potential for conflagration.
• Protect government infrastructure.
• Protect exposed buildings with emphasis on habitable structures on incidents that
  exceed available resource capability.

PERSONNEL SAFETY

"When a riot erupts, the police are the immediate target. This view is easily and very
often transferred to other uniformed personnel, including firefighters and EMS personnel
entering a riot zone, even though their purpose is to bring aid." (Task Force on Civil Unrest
1994, pp. 27) For this reason, the wearing of personal protective equipment (PPE), is an
important aspect in providing personnel safety.

The Tempe, Arizona Fire Department requires that all personnel respond A...to and from
all emergencies in full protective clothing (helmet, bunkers, etc.), and will remain in full gear
until returned to staging or their assigned fire station. (Tempe Fire Department 1999) Orange
County, California requires their personnel to wear helmets and wildland coats (Orange County
Fire Services 1994), while the Huntington Beach and Torrance, California Fire Departments
require their personnel to wear ballistic body armor. (Huntington Beach Fire Department 1998 & Torrance Fire Department 1997)

PRIORITIZATION: Responding to Calls for Service

Some form of prioritization for incident action needs to be a component of policies that
provide guidance to fire officers. "When any community is faced with a major fire problem
associated with civil disorder, it is no longer possible to provide what we know as normal or
customary fire protection." (Eisner 1992)

The rate of incident occurrence is another issue that Harvey Eisner identifies as an
important component of resource management. During the Los Angeles Watts riots of 1965, the
first incident occurred at 1300 hours. By 2100 hours that night, the Los Angeles City Fire
Department and supporting agencies had deployed "forty-five task forces (each) consisting of
two engines, a ladder company and a battalion chief, were in operation in the troubled area." (Eisner 1992)

The Los Angeles City Fire Department again found its resources and standard procedures
inadequate during the rioting that resulted from the Rodney King case. Since that time the
Department has adopted new policies and procedures which better provide for operational needs
during times of disorder. (Warford, et. al. 1993) Although the Los Angeles City Fire
Department is much larger than the Eugene Fire and EMS Department, and the incidents
LACFD has responded to involving civil disturbances have been more violent and destructive,
much of
what they have learned from their experiences can be applied in the development of policies and procedures for smaller organizations.

Los Angeles County Fire Department has adopted a concept referred to as, ABattalion Centered Command. In an interview with Los Angeles County Fire Department Operations Chief Deputy William Zeason, he was quoted as saying, ABattalion Command worked very well. It pushes field command to the lowest level possible to ensure safety of personnel. It encourages individual initiative and judgement based on the situation and still compliments overall Department Command. (Lockhart 1992)

RISK & OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

Following the April 1992 civil disturbance, the Los Angeles City Fire Department initiated an event specific planning process for several situations that posed a civil disturbance risk. "Through this process, field commanders became familiar with unique areas or structures that may be impacted during a civil disturbance." (Warford, et. al. 1993) According to the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance Preparedness Report, this pre-planning included the following features for the "Hollywood Operational Plan," which became a "template for subsequent events with the potential for civil unrest." (Warford, et. al. 1993)

1. Designated law enforcement escorts in place.
2. Liaison Officers established.
3. Pe-deployed fire suppression and medical tac-teams.
4. Communications plan established.
5. Air Operations plan established.
6. Command Post established.
"In all cases, this planning provided an increased knowledge of the areas where a potential for civil disturbance existed, and caused field commanders to address, in advance, issues of Command Post locations, staging areas, response routes, and deployment of Tac Teams and Medical Tac Teams. Additionally, the working relationships between the LAFD and the LAPD were strengthened through these planning efforts." (Warford, et. al. 1993)

The literature indicates that pre-planning is one of the most essential elements in preparing for a successful operation in areas involved in civil disturbances. Therefore, a component of a civil disorder policy should be planning.

PASSIVE PROTESTS: EXTRICATION OF PROTESTERS

While the civil disturbances experienced in some of the larger communities across the country are more extreme than those that have occurred or are anticipated in the Eugene area, lessons can be learned from their experiences. Although Eugene has been exposed to violence, and experienced property damage as a result of protests, a more common experience has been the need to extricate protesters who have secured themselves to fixed objects to disrupt businesses, events, or construction work while drawing attention to the protestor=s cause.

Thus it is important to have policies and procedures in place for conducting such extrication work in this unique environment.

LIABILITY

Liability must also be taken into consideration and minimized when extricating protesters who have secured themselves to a fixed object. Captain Mark McLees of the Syracuse, New
York Fire Department advises that, "When dealing with activists, don't be fooled into thinking you are 'just doing your job' and that they will not hold you in the same light as the police." (McLees 1996) Should something break loose during extrication operations and injure one of the protesters, they can easily turn around and sue the involved personnel and the department. By providing for the safety of the protestors during an extrication operation, and in documenting those actions, liability exposure for the fire department, and the emergency services workers will be limited. (McLees 1996)

Law suits have already been filed against the City of Eugene, individual police officers and one fire lieutenant following the removal of a number of protesters from trees during an incident occurring in June of 1997. (Bishop 1999) "Remember, the protesters did not ask to be released from their self-induced bondage. Make sure that you properly (and possibly) overprotect them from your cutting tools." (McLees 1996) Given the highly litigious society we live in today, this appears to be good sound advice.

Reducing an agency's level of liability should also be a consideration in the development of both civil disorder policies and procedures. Many of the steps taken to reduce liability will also benefit the most important area of concern, firefighter safety which should be at the heart of any operational objectives.

What procedures should be employed by fire fighters and emergency medical personnel when responding into areas involved in civil disorder to minimize risk to themselves and the public?

Procedures serve as a guide to fire service personnel specifying how to operate, and what
steps to take, and in what order to take them under certain conditions. A procedure is defined in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language as, "A series of steps or course of action." (Davies 1972)

In developing a set of operational procedures, it is important that they are compatible with the organizations over arching polices that guide decision making. Information from the literature review that addressed policy development was presented in answering the previous research question.

One of the most basic concepts that must be incorporated into any civil disturbance procedure is a provision for the safety of personnel. This was the primary theme presented in an applied research project by Los Angeles, County Fire Department Battalion Chief Gary M. Lockhart, entitled Command and Control of Fire Service Resources During Civil Disturbance. Chief Lockhart’s project utilized interviews with a number of Los Angeles, City and County Fire Department chief officers involved with the Rodney King riots in 1992. In every interview conducted by Chief Lockhart, the safety of personnel was the primary concern expressed by the chief officers interviewed. (Lockhart 1992)

As a part of this safety concern, Chief Lockhart identified the need for assigning observers on incidents to watch for both incident and non-incident related hazards. In Chief Lockhart’s interview with Los Angeles County Operations Chief Deputy William Zeason, Zeason recommended that an observer be posted, on each incident to watch crowd behavior, to make sure law enforcement stays on scene, and to watch our personnel and fire ground conditions. This will help to reduce the chances of a hasty and disorganized retreat that could possibly leave personnel behind. (Lockhart 1992)
All of the procedures reviewed placed a high priority on situational awareness and firefighter safety. The Orange County Fire Department refers to situational awareness as, 360 degree firefighter safety. (Orange County Fire Department 1994)

EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES:

Although there was some information about emergency medical treatment and the transportation of patients associated with violence and civil unrest, there was very little information on EMS delivery systems and operations during periods of civil disorder. The best information located during the literature review was provided by Los Angeles Fire Department Chief Paramedic Alan R. Cowen, who represented the fire service on a committee following the Rodney King riots, and examined hospital emergency room safety and security. The committee found that 64% of (Los Angeles, CA) area hospitals have had staff members assaulted, and 29% of these assaults involved firearms. State Assembly Bill No. 508, requiring hospitals to develop security measures, addressed the concerns of this committee. (Warford, et. al. 1993)

Chief Cowen also directed his staff to develop, casualty collection points to be established in secured sites adjacent to local hospitals, where large numbers of sick and injured will be transported by private vehicles, rather than to an LAFD staging area. (Warford, et. al. 1993) The Los Angeles Fire Department learned a lot from the Rodney King riots of 1992, and has since put into practice and policy a number of procedures that provide for personnel safety, and reasonable service delivery under such conditions.

The Tempe, Arizona Fire Department specifies in their Civil Disturbance Plan that, Patients may be more effectively treated in a potentially violent situation if the patient is
rapidly removed from the scene to an exterior treatment area (scoop and run). (Tempe Fire Department 1999) The Bellevue, Washington Fire Department has a similar procedure in their Tactical Alert Operations Procedure that calls for patients to be treated while leaving the impacted area and en route to the hospital. (Bellevue Fire Department 1997)

Bellevue Fire Department also has a procedure established for using a single medic unit as opposed to a tactical team for going in and extracting patients from an area involved in a civil disturbance. (Bellevue Fire Department 1997)

**FIRE SUPPRESSION TACTICS**

During fire fighting operations in the impact area, the Task Force on Civil Unrest recommends the following approach. "In order to reach their objectives and lessen the danger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics. The goal is to knock down the fire and quickly exit the impact area." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp.46)

This same recommendation of changing fire fighting tactics was identified in Chief Lockhart=s paper based on his interviews. The need for operating companies to stay highly mobile was emphasized. These tactics, and the strategies they support, should be communicated to field officers. (Lockhart 1992)

The Los Angeles City Fire Department developed a set of tactical guidelines to be employed during the initial phases of a civil disorder incident: (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp.17)

1. Work in organized groups (Task Force/Strike Team) and utilize police escorts.
2. Employ hit-and-run tactics, quickly knock down the fire and move on to the next prioritized incident.
3. Modify the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs):
   A. No personnel on roofs.
   B. No laddering of buildings.
   C. Deactivate aerial ladder truck companies in the impact area.
   D. No overhauling of fires.
   E. No interior fire attack.
   F. No wearing of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus.

   The Task Force goes on to recommend that engine companies should be deployed in the
   impact area with truck companies available but not committed unless needed. "There should be
   no interior fire fighting in impact areas." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp.46)

   Firefighters should prepare the apparatus prior to responding into areas involved in civil
   disorder. Open cab apparatus and hose beds should be covered to protect firefighters and
   equipment from debris or burning objects. Likewise, "all tools and appliances should be
   removed from locations on the outside of apparatus and put into compartments or other
   inconspicuous places to eliminate the lawless from easily obtaining them and using them as
   weapons against the firefighters." (Eisner 1992)

   PASSIVE PROTESTS: EXTRICATION OF PROTESTERS

   In addition to the more extreme forms of civil disorder that have been reviewed are the
   peaceful demonstrations where protestors attach themselves to some stationary object to disrupt
   business or stop work.

   When extricating protestors, Captain Mark McLees of the Syracuse, New York Fire
   Department cited the importance of personnel wearing adequate personal safety equipment when
involved in an operation. Gloves and eye protection were required of his rescue personnel when extricating protestors who had attached themselves with handcuffs and U-shaped bicycles locks to a steel security gate. "Those not directly involved in the tool work wore a minimum of latex gloves and eye protection to shield themselves from any bodily fluids the protesters may have chosen to heap on them." (McLees 1996)

In considering some of the specific types of locking devices that can be used by protesters to secure themselves to a fixed object, one just needs to visit their local hardware store or bicycle shop. Captain McLees found that the U-shaped bicycle locks, chains, and krypton pad locks could easily be removed using a hydraulic cutter. On the other hand, the bicycle coil type security device is made up of individual strands of steel wire twisted together which can better be removed by using a pair of standard bolt cutters. (McLees 1996)

Englewood, New Jersey Fire Department experienced a similar incident on August 7, 1996, when a group of five protesters, "had gained entry into the building (an abortion clinic) and locked themselves together with horseshoe, or U-shaped, bicycle locks." (Johnston 1996) Fire personnel used a hand held pneumatic cutting device to extricate the protesters after each one was carefully covered with a blanket for protection. (Johnston 1996)

Englewood Fire Department was better prepared for this incident after experiencing a similar situation for which they were not prepared. At this first incident, firefighters, "...took apart a door to which about a dozen protesters had locked themselves. All of them were picked up together and taken to the city jail on a flatbed tow truck." (Johnston 1996)

In considering various types of locking devices and contacting manufacturers for advise, Mike Johnston learned that some locks have over, "12,000 pounds of breaking force." "This puts
conventional forcible entry and extrication tools out of the picture in many cases." (Johnston 1996) Johnston goes on to state that, "...the easiest way to get through a lock is with the key." Therefore, "...before cutting the locks, ask whether the protesters or others are holding the keys?" (Johnston 1996)

**At what level should fire and police coordinate operations and interact with one another in areas involved in civil disorder?**

**COMMUNICATIONS**

One of the greatest challenges in managing any complex and dynamic incident is efficient and effective inter-agency communication. The literature places a high priority on preplanning both the organizational command and control structure and developing a system that facilitates effective communications between agencies. "An incident command system (ICS) should be defined and implemented in both fire/EMS and police agencies. The agencies should develop the flexibility to adopt this mode immediately, without confusion or conflict, and the unified police/fire command should extend to the policy level." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 31)

ABC News Political Director and volunteer firefighter Hal Bruno asserts that, "it's essential to plan riot operations, with emphasis on coordination and communications between the police and fire departments." (Bruno 1992)

Harvey Eisner recommends that "a high ranking fire officer should be assigned to police headquarters with a pre-arranged liaison with a high ranking police official. He or she should be capable of expediting requests for police assistance received from fire forces in the field." (Eisner 1992) Some type of formal pre-determined communication and decision making system
between police and fire operations appears to be an important component in successful operations.

Another communication aid suggested by the Joint Task Force on Civil Unrest is the use of cellular telephones between police and fire units. "Agency executives may desire to enter into special arrangements with cellular telephone companies to provide this equipment to its personnel." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 34) The Task Force also suggests using compatible radio frequencies, although in the State of Oregon, police and fire operate on different radio bands.

A procedure also needs to be established for communicating the need for police assistance, and making a formal request for escort service. As an example, Orange County, California uses the following procedure: (Orange County Fire Department 1994)

- Fire command will contact the lead law enforcement agency and request units for security / escort duty.
- The law enforcement agency will then either provide the needed police elements for the missions or request mutual aid through their area mutual aid coordinator, identifying the mission as a fire security / escort.
- Once the required law enforcement elements are present at the staging area, the secured fire elements will then proceed with their assignments.

PLANNING

The Webster Commission was appointed by the Los Angeles Police Commission to assess the Los Angeles Police Department's response following the April 1992 "Rodney King" civil disturbances. This commission developed a number of police specific recommendations,
but also addressed some general concerns that transcend into the fire department.

In a letter to Los Angeles Fire Chief Donald O. Manning, William H. Webster, the Commission Chair, cites the importance of preparation and an interagency response to civil disturbances. A successful operation will result from, "...careful preparation, planning, joint exercising and continued liaison." (Webster 1993) Mr. Webster goes on to suggest that centralized decision-making and communication, following the Incident Command System (ICS) used by the fire service, is of great value in such a situation.

The Torrance, California Fire Department=s Civil Unrest Contingency Plan calls for joint planning between police and fire, and provides a structure through which operational intelligence is gathered, sorted and disseminated. Intelligence is thus sorted into four categories: (Torrance Fire Department 1997)

- Strategic Intelligence.
- Operational Intelligence.
- Tactical Intelligence.
- Logistical Support Intelligence.

The San Jose, California Fire Department=s Official Action Guide has a provision for establishing administrative procedures with police to maintain reports and records during a civil disorder. (San Jose Fire Department 1997)

POLICE ESCORTS

Mr. Webster also cites the critical need for dedicated police escorts to be assigned to fire
service strike teams and task forces. "While firefighters routinely respond without police protection, the civil disturbance last April (1992) sharply demonstrated that firefighters simply cannot function without police protection in the face of hostile crowds. Unfortunately, a lack of coordination by the LAPD hampered both general interdepartmental training and planning and the LAFD's specific efforts to plan for post-verdict trouble." (Webster 1993)

During the 1992 Los Angeles riots, some fire service strike teams sat idle for over two hours waiting for police escort service. "In addition, LAPD escorts not assigned exclusively to escort duty often broke away to respond to other calls, leaving fire resources either unprotected or forced to return to the command post to wait for another escort." (Webster 1993) He goes on to discuss the importance of planning ahead for relief and the, "...in-field shift changes of LAPD escorts, to avoid leaving fire strike teams unprotected." (Webster 1993)

While the LAFD and LAPD experienced interagency coordination and operational problems, the police escort function began working on the second day of the riots after the California Highway Patrol (CHP) became involved and assumed this role. Mr. Webster attributed this improved operation to previous planning and training that had occurred between the LAFD and CHPs. "Unrelated to the impending verdict, LAFD and CHP commands had planned and trained together over the past two years to enhance the ways each could complement and coordinate with the work of the other." (Webster 1993)

Mr. Webster attributed part of the coordination problem between the LAFD and LAPD to the fact that escorts were assigned from the LAPD Metro Division where their organization's tactical teams are based, and their resources are limited for a large scale operation. "A less tactically advanced group of officers, such as Traffic Division, could be adequately trained for
escort functions." (Webster 1993)

**JOINT POLICE/FIRE TRAINING & PREPARATION**

"Joint training exercises and simulations can be very helpful in educating and preparing fire and police personnel to work together effectively during civil unrest." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 48) While such training is supported in the literature, it may be difficult to proactively develop and schedule this type of training between police and fire.

One of the outcomes following the April 1992 civil disturbance in Los Angeles was the development of a series of joint training and meetings between the police and fire department personnel assigned in areas at risk. "Scene safety/security and civil disturbance tactics were a major part of the training agenda." (Warford, et. al. 1993)

The subject matter of one specific series of LAFD/LAPD training included the following relevant subjects: (Warford, et. al. 1993)

1. Ambush and Sniper Recognition.

2. Apparatus Placement:
   A. Firefighting Operations.
   B. EMS Operations.

3. Body Armor:
   A. Proper Use.
   B. Effectiveness.

4. LAPD Civil Disturbance Tactics:
   A. Crowd Control.
   B. Non-lethal Weapons.
C. Tear Gas Procedures.

5. LAPD Escort Procedures and Planning.

6. LAPD Gang Intelligence.

"This program of interagency training had immediate benefits to the LAFD. Police officers began visiting fire stations on a frequent basis to update fire personnel on new intelligence information that was relevant, and simply to get to know the firefighters and paramedics on a more personal basis." (Warford, et. al. 1993) Although police officers frequent fire stations in Eugene, joint training seldom occurs except in the area of special teams operations.

Captain Mark McLees of the Syracuse, New York Fire Department identifies the hazard of complacency. Prior to extricating anti-fur protestors who had attached themselves to a fur store security gate, police were asked if they had searched the protestors for weapons prior to the fire personnel approaching them. This safety consideration was overlooked. Captain McLees speculated that, "The law enforcement community may well have considered these protesters simply as a bunch of mixed-up, spoiled college kids." (McLees 1996)

"In reality, however, the store owner actually had an order of protection against the leader of this protest group. Any one of these mixed-up kids easily could have had mace or a concealed weapon." (McLees 1996)

During the anti-abortion protest occurring in Englewood, New Jersey, the police supported the firefighters extrication efforts by maintaining a "security zone" to keep additional
protesters from interfering with the firefighters. (Johnston 1996)

The following excerpt from the Task Force on Civil Unrest presents the perspectives and needs of what both fire and police chiefs have identified as wanting from the other to successfully work together during times of civil unrest.

During the course of their deliberations, the Task Force on Civil Unrest developed the following lists, prepared by each agency (fire and police), which outline a two-way flow of actions and data/information in response to a given situation. The lists appear in order of priority.

**Fire Personnel -- support expected from the Police Department**

1. Protection of fire personnel, both en route and on the scene.
2. Information regarding resource capabilities of police personnel.
3. Accurate, up-to-date intelligence briefings.
4. Better communications/coordination with police at all levels.
5. Knowledge of police needs from fire personnel.
6. Joint training on incident command, according to accepted and agreed upon standards.
7. Delineation of each agency's responsibilities (who is in charge of what).
8. Financial responsibilities of each department.

**Police Personnel -- support expected from the Fire Department:**

1. Protection of police personnel (by EMS/rescue).
2. Realistic expectations (support from police), based on resources available.
3. Immediate liaison-sharing between fire/EMS and police.
4. Intelligence liaisons.

5. Sharing of critical information -- floor plans, elevators, etc.

6. Joint training on incident command and other issues (exercises).


Joint police/fire training was also identified by the Task Force on Civil Unrest as an important area that needs to be addressed in the planning for civil disorder procedures. "By learning together, getting to know one another, and establishing a common *modus operandi*, valuable time will be saved when it becomes necessary to set up a joint ICS during a crisis." (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 48) The Task Force report goes on to say that this was one of the lessons learned from the Los Angeles riots.

"Active training is as important in civil disturbance situations as in all other facets of firefighting and law enforcement. Strategic goals must be communicated all the way down to line personnel." Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994, pp. 48)

**PROCEDURES**

The development of a clear definition for "civil disturbance" was heavily influenced by some of the initial research, and then refined for the purposes of this Applied Research Project. The definition is as follows: *A Civil Disturbance is the intentional disobedient behavior by a group of people in violation of public policy, laws or regulations, that results in some form of community disruption.* For the purpose of this paper, the terminology "civil disturbance" and "civil disorder," should be considered interchangeable.
Following a literature search and review, a draft survey containing nineteen questions was developed to measure the problem of civil disorder, and compare the Eugene Fire and EMS Department's experience and level of preparation to other western fire service agencies. The survey areas were then refined following the four research questions, and the format used in the presentation of the literature was followed to provide a level of continuity.

The four research questions are:

1. What is civil disorder, and what are the most frequent causes of civil disturbances that result in fire suppression or emergency medical services response?
2. What policies should be in place to provide fire service command officers a framework within which to operate?
3. What procedures should be employed by firefighters and emergency medical personnel when responding into areas involved in civil disorder to minimize risk to themselves and the public?
4. At what level should fire and police coordinate operations and interact with one another in areas involved in civil disorder?

The completed draft survey instrument was then further refined based on a consultation from Ms. Beth Bridges, the manager of the City of Eugene's Service Improvement Team. One of Ms. Bridges responsibilities in her position with the City is to oversee the development, distribution and measurement of all City of Eugene surveys. She provided valuable assistance by challenging some of the concepts, helped modify certain questions to reduce ambiguity, advised that the definition of "civil disturbance" be included with the survey, and provided assistance with the final sequencing of the questions, e.g. beginning with the easier questions and
concluding with the two most complex and difficult. Although the sequence of the survey questions is different from their presentation sequence in this paper, the modification made for an easier to follow survey instrument.

The draft instrument was then administered to two Eugene Fire and EMS chief officers for review and comment prior to completion. One of these chief officers, Planning Chief Ruth Obadal, is an Executive Fire Officer Program graduate, the other Logistics Chief Taylor Robertson, is in his third year of the program. They both provided additional advice which helped improve and further refine the instrument.

The final survey instrument was then mailed to the sixty-four (64) municipal fire departments that comprised the survey population, and consist of the municipal fire departments in the States of Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Nevada, and Arizona, that serve populations of 100,000 or greater. Fire Districts and private fire service agencies were excluded from the survey as a means of maintaining a manageable survey population, and in consideration that many fire protection districts, with the exception of several in the southern California region, do not serve urban populations.

Since civil disorder appears to be most prevalent in urban areas, it was felt that eliminating fire protection districts from the survey population would most likely eliminate those jurisdictions less prone to the problem of fire service civil disturbance response.

Of the sixty-four (64) surveys mailed, forty-three (43) were returned which provided a return rate of 67.19%. Although unsolicited, six agencies included copies of their civil disturbance procedures along with the completed survey instrument. This additional information was greatly appreciated and the material was used in the development of the Eugene Civil
Disturbance Policy and Procedures drafts, presented in Appendix A and B respectively at the end of this paper.

Although the receipt of these six policies and procedures were of significant value to the research, policies and procedures were specifically not solicited because it was feared this added burden would pose a deterrent to completing and returning the survey instrument. It is recognized that in recent years the use of surveys by the fire service has increased significantly.

The survey findings were then presented in the "Results" section of this paper. Each survey question was placed appropriately into one of four categories that followed the research questions. Following the presentation of findings for each research question is a Eugene Fire & EMS Department comparison since this agency is being used as the baseline of comparison in this research project.

**Limitations:**

The major limitations experienced in this research included the difficulty in clearly defining the scope of the problem, and determining the percentage of fire service involvement to the relative number of incidents managed by the police without the fire service. It was also difficult to find another fire service agency, of approximately the same size and resource base as the City of Eugene, which has experienced a similar level and type of civil disorder.

A significant number of southern California fire departments had experienced only one incident of civil disorder, during the ten year period measured in the research, and this one event was associated with the Rodney King incident in the early 1990's. This fact may have skewed the results somewhat in trying to identify the most frequent primary causes for disorder, and their most common adverse effects.
A final limitation was that while the research was directed towards both fire suppression and emergency medical service delivery, most of the information found in the literature review addressed challenges associated with fire suppression and planning exclusively. This was at the exclusion of emergency medical service delivery.

**RESULTS**

The results from this research have been presented in a format that follows the research questions for easy reference and continuity. Following the presentation of the results for each survey question, is information about the Eugene experience as a comparison point of analysis. As described in the procedures section of this research paper, the Eugene Fire & EMS Department was used as a baseline of comparison.

**Research Question #1:** What is civil disorder, and what are the most frequent causes that result in fire suppression or emergency medical services response?

While the literature review provided some definition of civil disorder, and indicated that it was mostly an urban problem, the causes and the frequency of such behavior were not linked specifically to incidents that involved fire service intervention. Therefore, the first survey question posed in the research project was, *Survey Question #1:* "Has your agency responded into an area involved in a civil disturbance in the past ten (10) years? If yes, approximately how many times?"

Of the forty-three (43) responses, thirty-one (31), or 72.09% had experienced some type of disorder that required fire service response and intervention. Of this number only twenty-seven (27) indicated the frequency of their agency's response during the subject time period.
Central Tendency and the Statistical Findings of the Fire Service Response Frequency:

The "mean," or average response frequency of the twenty-seven (27) agencies who responded into areas involved in civil disturbances during the last ten years was 7.63. As a comparison, the Eugene Fire & EMS Department has been involved in fourteen (14) such responses during the same time period.

The "mode," or response frequency most commonly experienced by agencies which responded to civil disorder in the past ten years was only one.

The "median," or mid point value at which 50% of the respondents experienced more incidents, and 50% of the respondents experienced fewer incidents, and who also identified the frequency of such events, was 2.5.

Survey Question #18: "Of the civil disturbances that have occurred in your community during the last ten (10) years, please identify the four (4) most frequent (primary) causes."

When designing the survey, it was felt that by identifying the most frequent primary causes of civil disorder, fire service managers and planners could more easily identify possible indicators of potential disturbances further in advance. This survey question was comprised of ten categories which included an option of "other" category. The responses to this question are presented in the following table:

TABLE - 1
(Survey Question #18)

1) Out of Control Party or Recreational Activity 13
2) Environmental Issues 2
3) Abortion/Right to Life 3
4) Animal Rights 3
5) Socio-Economic Issues 9
6) Political (non-social) Issues 2
7) Racial Relations 18
8) Labor Disputes/Strikes 4
9) Reaction to Law Enforcement Activities 2
10) Other: 2

Number of returned survey instruments with no response provided 13

As reflected above; Racial Relations, Party or Recreational Activity, Socio-Economic Issues, and Labor Disputes/Strikes were the four (4) most frequent primary causes of civil disturbances indicated by the respondents. In comparison, the four (4) most frequent primary causes of civil disorder, in order of frequency, experienced by the Eugene Fire & EMS Department have been; Environmental Issues, Socio-Economic Issues (mostly attributed to the anarchist movement), Out of Control Parties, and Animal Rights.

Survey Question #17: Of the civil disturbances that have occurred in your community during the past ten (10) years, approximately what percentage, if any, occurred on or near the campus of an educational institution?" While it is recognized that not all agencies have an advanced educational institution in their response area, the City of Eugene Fire & EMS Department has experienced 21.43% of its calls involving civil disturbances, into areas immediately surrounding the University of Oregon campus. The frequency of response by the Eugene Police Department, where no fire or EMS response was necessary, has been significantly higher.

This was considered enough of a problem to make this type of association with disorder an area of interest when designing the survey. Of the thirty-one (31) agencies responding affirmatively to having responded into areas involved in civil disorder, only five (5) agencies indicated any association with an educational institution. Of these five (5) agencies however,
three (3) attributed 50% of their civil disorder calls to educational institutions, one identified 75%, and one identified 1% of their call volume.

Although less associated with response, intervention and mitigation, the survey also asked for the most common adverse effects associated with civil disturbances as they related to outcome experience. *Survey Question #19: “Of the civil disturbances that have occurred in your community during the past ten (10) years, please identify the four (4) most common adverse effects?”* The survey question provided ten (10) categories, and as provided in survey question #18, included an "other" category. The responses were as follows:

| Table - 2 (Survey Question #19) |
|---------------------------------|------|
| 1) Disruption of Business and Commerce | 16   |
| 2) Protestors Attached to Fixed Objects Requiring Extrication | 3    |
| 3) Property Damage from Vandalism | 22   |
| 4) Property Damage from Fire | 20   |
| 5) Damage to Fire/EMS Apparatus and Equipment | 8    |
| 6) Injuries to Protestors | 17   |
| 7) Injuries to Bystanders | 15   |
| 8) Injuries to Police Officers | 8    |
| 9) Injuries to Firefighter/Paramedics | 3    |
| 10) Other: Disruption of residential areas near beach | 1    |
| Disruption of traffic flow | 1    |
| Number of returned survey instruments with no response provided | 16   |

As reflected above; Property Damage from Vandalism, Property Damage from Fire, Injuries to Protestors, and Disruption of Business and Commerce were the four (4) most frequent adverse effects of civil disorder accounting for, twenty-two (22), twenty (20), seventeen (17) and sixteen (16) occurrences respectively. In comparison, the four (4) most common adverse effects
associated with civil disturbances experienced by the Eugene Fire & EMS Department have been; Disruption of Business and Commerce, Property Damage from Vandalism, Protestors Attached to Fixed Objects Requiring Extrication, and Injuries to Protestors.

**Research Question #2:** What policies should be in place to provide fire service command officers a framework within which to operate?

The literature review provided some good information on what should be taken into consideration in the development of fire service civil disturbance response policies. The survey instrument then sought to measure what policy decisions, if any, had been made by the survey population to guide response and intervention in areas involved in civil disturbances.

Results from this survey, and from the literature review, were then used to develop a draft civil disturbance policy that can be found in Appendix A of this paper.

The first survey questions in this section sought to determine the percentage of the survey population that had some type of written guide for response into involved areas. *Survey Question #2: "Does your agency currently have a written contingency plan, policy, procedure, or set of operational objectives for response into areas involved in a civil disturbance?"* Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty (30) agencies, or 69.77%, indicated that they did in fact have some type of written contingency plan in place, twelve (12), or 27.91%, responded that they did not, and one agency did not provide an answer to the question. Of the twelve (12) agencies that responded that they had no form of written plan in place, ten (10) had previously encountered
civil disturbances.

The Eugene Fire & EMS Department has had a procedure in place since the 1970's although in need of a significant upgrade. A policy was developed two years ago following a large scale incident on, 1 June 1997.

Survey Question #3: "Has your agency provided training for personnel within the past five (5) years on fire department civil disturbance procedures?" This question sought to measure the extent to which the survey population had provided some level of civil disturbance training to its personnel. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, twenty-four (24), or 55.81%, indicated that some training had been provided within the past five (5) years, while nineteen (19), or 44.19%, responded that they had not.

The Eugene Fire and EMS Department has provided no department wide training to its personnel on civil disturbance procedures, but it has conducted policy and procedure reviews on a smaller scale by district.

Survey Question #4: Has your agency provided training for personnel in the past five (5) years on personal safety measures when operating in hostile environments? This question was designed to assess what extent the survey population provided some level of personal safety training to its personnel that could also be applied during a civil disturbance. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty (30), or 69.77%, indicated that some training had been provided within the past five (5) years on personal safety measures, while thirteen (13), or 30.23%, responded that they had not.

The Eugene Fire & EMS Department has provided department wide personal safety training within the past five (5) years designed to raise personal awareness, and help fire fighters
and paramedics better assess potential threats, and determine when to withdraw from a situation.

Survey Question #11: "Does your agency modify its response when entering areas involved in a civil disturbance, (e.g., form units into a task force, strike team, or increase staffing)? If yes, how?" This question sought to measure the survey population's practice of modifying their deployment and or response packages when responding into an area involved in a civil disturbance. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty-five (35), or 81.40%, indicated that responses were modified, and 18.60% indicated that they did not.

The second part of the question asked respondents to describe how their agency's response was modified. The following reflects the response, by category, that was provided by the respondents. Some respondents described a modified deployment that identified more than one of the following. The most frequent combination was Task Force/Strike Team with a police escort. Although the information below has little statistical significance, the information was provided as a point of interest.

1. Form into a Task Force or Strike Team 24
2. Respond with Police 16
3. Supervisor makes a determination whether or not to modify response 5
4. Staffing is increased 1

The Eugene Fire and EMS Department also modifies its response into effected areas. Modifications are contingent upon the type of call and the nature of the incident. Eugene's most common method is to either form up into a Task Force or Strike Team for fire response, or over staff a single resource with extra personnel, such as a medic unit, and respond them in from a
staging area to extract patients. The level of threat is assessed prior to deploying in this manner.

Survey Question #13: "Does your agency discontinue responding to certain types of calls in areas involved in a civil disturbance? This question sought to measure the survey population's modification of response criteria, if any, into areas involved in a civil disturbance. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, twenty-two (22), or 51.16%, indicated that they did discontinue responding to certain types of calls in involved areas, and seventeen (17), or 39.53%, indicated that they did not. In addition, three respondents wrote on the survey instrument that no policy existed in their agency, and one respondent did not answer the question.

In comparison, the Eugene Fire and EMS Department limits response into involved areas to life threatening calls for service. This includes reported fires.

Research Question #3: What procedures should be employed by fire fighters and emergency medical personnel when responding into areas involved in civil disorder to minimize risk to themselves and the public?

While Research Question #2 asked what should be contained in a fire service policy governing response and service delivery into areas involved in civil disturbances, Research Question #3 focuses on what should be contained in a fire service civil disturbance procedure. In this area, the literature review also provided some good information on what considerations should be taken into account in the development of fire service civil disturbance response procedures.

The survey instrument was then used to determine whether an identified group of procedures were employed by agencies in the survey population to guide response and
operations in areas involved in civil disorder. These findings, along with the information obtained from existing literature, was used to develop a draft Standard Operating Procedure presented in Appendix B of this paper.

Survey Question #9: "Does your agency automatically notify on duty personnel of the location and magnitude of a civil disturbance in progress?" This question sought to measure the importance placed by the survey population on notifying on duty personnel of a civil disturbance in progress. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty-two (32) respondents, or 74.42%, indicated that they did notify personnel of active civil disturbances, ten (10), or 23.26%, indicated that they did not, and one did not provide any response to this question.

Survey Question #10: "Does your agency initiate additional security measures at stations located in areas potentially threatened by an active civil disturbance? If yes, is a guard or station watch posted?" This survey question sought to measure what procedures are taken, if any, by the survey population to provide a level of fire station security in areas threatened by a civil disturbance. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, twenty-eight (28), or 65.12%, indicated that some additional measure of security was taken, and fifteen (15), or 34.88%, responded that no additional measures were taken.

The question also asked if a guard or station watch was posted? Fourteen (14), or 32.56%, responded yes, twenty-three (23), or 53.49%, responded no, and six (6) provided no response to the second part of survey question #10. As a comparison, Eugene has had no procedure in place to post station watches or guards, however, there have been past events during which time an on-duty supervisor opted to assign one fire fighter to stay behind and serve
as station watch. Eugene crews are directed to secure all doors, windows and points of access during times of civil disorder if the station location is proximate to the disturbance.

Survey Question #12: "Does your agency establish a staging area for units to report to prior to responding into areas involved in a civil disturbance?" The literature review seemed to place a priority on establishing a staging area for units to form up prior to deployment into an involved area. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty-six (36), or 83.72%, indicated that a procedure was in place to establish a staging area, and seven (7), or 16.28%, responded that no additional measures were taken.

The Eugene Fire and EMS Department establishes a staging area by procedure, although no set number of units are specified in a civil disturbance deployment.

Survey Question #14: "Does your agency continue to use emergency lights and audible warning devices when responding into areas involved in a civil disturbance?" This question sought to measure the survey population's use of warning devices common to fire service response when operating in areas involved in a civil disturbance. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, twenty-four (24), or 55.81%, indicated that they continue to use lights and audible warning devices, fifteen (15), or 34.88%, responded that they suspend use of warning devices, one respondent wrote in on the survey instrument that they had no procedure that addressed this issue, and three (3) respondents did not answer the question.

By current procedure, the Eugene Fire and EMS Department discontinues the use of all warning devices when responding into an involved area. During development of the new procedure, this issue will again be visited.
Survey Question #15: "Does your agency require personnel to wear full protective turn-out clothing and helmets when responding into areas involved in a civil disturbance?" This question sought to measure the survey population's use of personal protective equipment (PPE) when operating in involved areas. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty-eight (38), or 88.37%, indicated that personnel were required to wear turn-out clothing and protective equipment, four (4), or 9.30%, responded that they had no such requirement, and one respondent did not answer the question.

By current procedure, the Eugene Fire and EMS Department requires personnel to wear full protective turn-out clothing and helmets when responding into areas involved in a disturbance.

Survey Question #16: "Does your agency issue fire and EMS personnel ballistic vests to wear when entering areas involved in a civil disturbance?" The literature review indicated that a number of fire service agencies have begun issuing ballistic vests to their personnel to wear on certain types of high risk calls.

This question sought to measure how many agencies in the population group used such protective equipment. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, twenty-six (26), or 60.47%, indicated that their agencies issued ballistic vests, sixteen (16), or 37.21%, responded that they did not, and one respondent did not answer the question. The Eugene Fire and EMS Department does not currently use ballistic vests.

Research Question #4: At what level should fire and police coordinate operations and interact with one another in areas involved in civil disorder?

The literature placed a great deal of importance upon joint cooperation between police
and fire service agencies during times of civil disturbances. This research question thus sought to provide better insight into the level of cooperation and coordination that should exist between the two disciplines and areas of responsibility.

Survey Question #5: "Has your agency met with local law enforcement at the command level in the past five (5) years to discuss civil disturbance concerns and procedures?" Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty-three (33), or 76.74%, indicated that they had met at the command level with local law enforcement in the past five (5) years while ten (10), or 23.26%, responded that they had not.

In comparison, the Eugene Fire and EMS Department has met at least five (5) times in the past three (3) years. Although these meetings were very beneficial, and helped each discipline to better understand the other's procedures, the meetings all occurred either following actual incidents, or held in preparation for pending situations.

Survey Questions #6: "Does your agency have an agreement with local law enforcement to provide a police escort for fire and EMS units responding into areas involved in a civil disturbance? Is this agreement in writing?" This question sought to measure the survey population's use of police escorts for response into areas involved in civil disorder. The question was also designed to serve as a partial indicator of the level of cooperation between police and fire service agencies. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty-four (34), or 79.07%, indicated that an agreement existed with local law enforcement to provide police escort for fire service response, while nine (9), or 20.93%, responded that no such agreement was in place.

If the respondents answered yes to having an escort agreement with police, the survey question had a second part that asked if the agreement was in writing? Of the thirty-four (34)
respondents having an escort agreement, only eleven (11) indicated that the agreement was in writing.

The Eugene Fire & EMS Department has no such agreement with local law enforcement, however, a high degree of mutual support exists between the Police and Fire Departments.

Survey Question #7: "Does your agency have an agreement with local law enforcement to establish a joint command post to manage operations in areas involved in civil disturbance?"
This question sought to measure the survey population's practice of establishing a joint command post to better manage operations in areas involved in civil disturbance. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, Thirty-eight (38), or 88.37%, indicated that a joint command post was established, while five (5), or 11.63%, responded that no policy or practice was in place.

Survey Question #7 also had a second part to the question if the response was no, "If not, how do you coordinate operations with police and manage interagency communications? Is this method successful?" Of the respondents answering "no," three (3) indicated that communications were coordinated by either an Emergency Operations Center, if activated, or through the Dispatch Center. Additionally, one respondent indicated that communications were coordinated by the fire service incident commander based on the unique operational needs of the incident.

During the past two to three years, the Eugene Fire & EMS and Police Departments have begun establishing a joint command post that coordinates two separate field operations with each being assigned commanders. Although the hardware has not yet been installed on the police side, and the procedures are yet to be developed, the Police Department is in the process of equipping their command units with fire radios. The Fire Department has had police radio
communications capability for about six years, but no procedures have been in place to communicate on police frequencies.

Survey Question #8: "Does your agency have an agreement or a system established with local law enforcement to share intelligence on situations that may potentially result in civil disturbance?" This question sought to measure the survey population's level of preparation and cooperation in sharing intelligence information. Early notification provides the fire service time to prepare for civil disturbance and even develop an operational plan based on the most recent information. Of the forty-three (43) returned surveys, thirty-four (34), or 79.07%, indicated that they have an agreement or system established with local law enforcement to share criminal intelligence, while seven (7) respondents, or 16.28%, indicated no such agreement or system was in place. Two respondents did not provide an answer to the question.

As a comparison, the Eugene Fire and EMS Department has developed an excellent relationship with the Eugene Police Department's Intelligence Unit, and has received very good information about potential protests, demonstrations and acts of domestic terrorism. This is probably one of the best improvements made in recent years to address the problems associated with civil disturbances in Eugene.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Ralph Conant, in his book *The Prospects For Revolution*, describes Civil Disobedience as an open and intentional violation of public policy, law, or regulation for the sake of principle or for the welfare of the community. A Rioting on the other hand, "... is a spontaneous outburst of group violence characterized by excitement mixed with rage. Riots are usually directed against alleged perpetrators of injustice or gross misuses of political power."
Although the Eugene Fire & EMS Department has experienced some riotous incidents, a majority of the associated calls could more accurately be described as Civil Disobedience. The sources all acknowledged the unique challenges associated with delivering fire and emergency medical services to areas involved in a civil disturbance. "Civil disturbance events stress the limits of fire department resources far beyond what is encountered during normal operations." (Lockhart 1992) Likewise, a majority of the respondents from the survey indicated that their agencies do in fact modify their response and limit the types of calls they respond to in areas involved in civil disorder. When any community is faced with a major fire problem associated with civil disorder, it is no longer possible to provide what we know as normal or customary fire protection. (Eisner 1992)

The fact that operations must be modified during times of disorder may hamper response and mitigation efforts, but it is a necessity in providing for the safety of the involved personnel. When rioting erupts, the police are the immediate target. This view is easily and very often transferred to other uniformed personnel, including firefighters and EMS personnel entering a riot zone, even thought their purpose is to bring aid. (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994) In looking to the survey, Question #19 asked; Of the civil disturbances that have occurred in your community during the last ten (10) years, please identify the four (4) most common adverse effects. Eight (8) respondents identified injuries to police officers, three (3) identified injuries to firefighter/paramedics, and eight (8) identified damage to fire/EMS apparatus and equipment. Although these are low percentages statistically, they do indicate a level of threat that does exist during a civil disturbance.
Although the literature didn’t specifically quantify civil disturbance frequency of occurrence, it did go into detail about a number of case studies, all of which were more severe than the Eugene Fire & EMS Department’s experience. The survey on the other hand did attempt to quantify the frequency of occurrence within the survey population, during the past ten years. The results were unexpected in that the average frequency of occurrence experienced by the survey population was only one, which was significantly lower than expected. In comparison, Eugene’s Fire Department has experienced fourteen such events, and Eugene’s Police Department many more during the same time period.

Fire service agencies which serve populations at risk of civil disorder must plan and prepare for such an event. Field commanders should become, familiar with unique areas or structures that may be impacted during a civil disturbance. (Warford, et. al. 1993) This level of preplanning is important because areas that personnel are familiar with during normal conditions, have the potential of becoming traps, or posing significant problems during a civil disturbance.

Warford goes on to say that, "preparation for emergencies ideally involves both general planning and training for large-scale incidents, and specific planning for civil unrest, including event-specific plans for an identified risk..." (Warford, et. al. 1993) Although the draft policies and procedures attached to this research project do not specifically address planning, pre-emergency planning is a critical component of operational preparedness.

The fire service, like many institutions, tends to identify needs only after an event has occurred, and a lack of preparation has been noted. With this fact in mind, training and familiarity with unique policies and procedures should receive the appropriate attention prior to
experiencing a disturbance. Fire protection and emergency medical service delivery under such conditions changes dramatically from the way it is usually conducted. For example, under such conditions there is less of an effort to minimize secondary property damage associated with fire suppression efforts. Instead, in order to reach their objectives and lessen the danger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics. The goal is to knock down the fire and quickly exit the impact area. (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994) This change in strategy and tactical priorities is a fundamental shift from traditional fire service practices. The goal becomes one of stopping conflagrations rather than confining fire to the room, floor, or building of origin. Likewise, emergency medical service delivery becomes more focused on getting the patient and crew out of the hazard area as opposed to patient stabilization in place.

Although less literature was located on emergency medical practices under civil disorder conditions, the City of Los Angeles Fire Department did identify the inherent risks associated with the treatment and transportation of patients involved in violence. In fact a survey of Los Angeles area hospital emergency rooms showed that 64% had experienced assaults on their staff, of which 29% involved firearms. (Warford, et. al. 1993) This illustrates a need for a certain profile of patient to be searched prior to treatment and transportation to the hospital.

The survey also asked a series of questions designed to assess critical areas of preparation for civil disorder response and mitigation efforts. In fact, a majority of respondent agencies had conducted training within the past five years on civil disturbance procedures and personal safety considerations under hostile conditions. Joint training exercises and simulations can be very helpful in educating and preparing fire and police personnel to work together effectively during civil unrest. (Task Force on Civil Unrest 1994) A majority of the respondents also indicated
that there was a system established with local law enforcement to share intelligence on situations that might potentially result in a civil disturbance. This advanced warning is important because it provides an added reaction time in preparing to sustain operations during such an incident.

Written policies and procedures are another area that warrants attention in preparing for a civil disturbance. A majority of the respondents had written procedures in place for conducting operations under civil disturbance conditions, and a majority had worked out procedures with law enforcement to provide for coordination of operations during disturbances. This is an area that the Eugene Fire & EMS Department has planned for in recognition of the need for close coordination, and a strong communications link between law enforcement and the fire service.

This concept of coordinated operations with the police is considered essential in providing for the safety of fire service personnel operating under the conditions encountered during a civil disturbance. Coordinated operations with the police is strongly recommended and supported in the literature. It is essential to plan riot operations, with emphasis on coordination and communications between the police and fire departments. (Bruno 1992)

Since the dissemination of accurate, complete and current information is essential to making good decisions under very stressful and hazardous conditions, strong communication links between police and fire operations is critical to a safe and successful operation. A communications plan should be in place and practiced prior to a fire and emergency medical service deployment into a hostile environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Personnel safety must remain at the forefront of any deployment and operational decisions associated with an area involved in civil disorder. This fact was consistently
emphasized in the literature, and supported in the data obtained from the survey respondents. While it is recognized that fire and EMS personnel routinely work in an environment fraught with hazards, the conditions that can exist during a civil disturbance pose unique operational challenges, and can present a level of threat not present in other activities.

Although the draft policy and procedures, found in Appendix A and B of this paper address safety as a primary consideration, the use of ballistic vests has not been added to the draft policy or procedure. While twenty-six of the respondents in the survey indicated that ballistic vests were utilized in their jurisdictions, it was felt that in Eugene, this added level of precaution is not warranted at this time. Although the City has experienced a high frequency of civil disorder, no incidents have resulted in the use of weapons other than rocks and bottles being thrown at police officers and fire apparatus. During the past ten years, no fire fighters have been injured in the course of operating at a civil disturbance. It is recommended that the consideration of ballistic vests for fire service personnel be reviewed with police, and given future consideration.

Also identified in the literature review was a need for a certain profile of patient to be searched prior to receiving treatment, and being placed in the back of an ambulance for transportation to the hospital. Based on the City of Los Angeles experience and research of area hospitals, this threat is something that needs to be taken very seriously. (Warford, et. al. 1993) Once confined in the enclosed area of an ambulance, fire and EMS personnel are subjected to substantial risk should the patient possess a weapon, and attempt to inflict harm on attending fire and EMS personnel. Likewise, delivery of a potentially armed patient to the hospital emergency room subjects the ER staff to unnecessary danger.
Planning and preparation is another area needing further attention. A community risk assessment, which was identified in the literature review, would be beneficial to both the Police Department and the Fire and EMS Department. In conducting this assessment, potential targets would be identified, and pre-emergency plans developed much like is currently done from a fire suppression perspective in Eugene. By identifying these potential targets, both police and fire can predetermine responses, and develop area specific procedures designed to aid in the mitigation of potential conflicts, and help provide for the community’s safety.

Another area identified for improvement is the communication process between the local police and fire agencies. Although the Eugene Fire & EMS Department enjoys a good working relationship with the City’s Police Department, there is still room for improvement in communications systems, practices, and the dissemination of information in a timely manner.

Interagency communications capabilities could be enhanced by developing the ability for police and fire command personnel to communicate by radio. Although all Eugene Fire & EMS command units are equipped with police radios, there is no procedure for using them. Instead, police radios are only used to monitor police communications. Although the information derived in this manner is of benefit, it would facilitate operations and provide for an enhanced level of safety if a direct communications link and procedure for using this resource were established.

It is therefore recommended that police command units be equipped with Fire Department radios, and that a procedure be established for radio communications between the two agencies. Such a discussion has already taken place in Eugene since this research project began. This added communication link would require hardware enhancement since, as was previously mentioned, the police and fire service operate on different radio bands in the State of
Oregon. Therefore, in order to have a compatible radio communication system, additional radio
equipment should be installed in the police command units. This step could help with critical
communications during all incidents involving mutual response.

Training is another area that should receive additional attention. While the intent behind
this research was to develop a new civil disturbance response policy and procedure, without
being accompanied with training, the effort is only half complete. The literature search produced
support for the importance of training personnel, and the survey showed that a majority of the
respondent agencies had provided training on civil disorder within the past five years.

It is therefore recommended that training be implemented in three phases. The first phase
should define what civil disorder is, the types of associated disturbances, behaviors, a
community historical perspective and experience, and the identification of the associated threats.
This first phase should also include a be discussion which defines the parameters of operation as
established by the community=s elected officials.

The second phase should address City and Departmental policies, procedures and
practices. Included in this phase should be police operational information and the associated
tactics and strategies to be deployed in support.

The final phase should be a hands on exercise that combines police, fire and EMS in a
structured operation. This operational exercise would reinforce the information presented in the
first two phases, and provide for a practical application opportunity between the two agencies. It
is also recommended that the Lane County Sheriff=s Office, the Oregon State Police and
potentially the United States Federal Marshal=s Office be involved in any such training and
exercise since they too are frequently involved in large scale incidents involving protests and civil disorder in the Eugene community.

Finally, policies and procedures should be provided as guidelines to help chief and company officers process information, and make decisions. Although these documents should be organized in a logical manner that provides realistic direction for incident decision makers, they should not eliminate the ability of well trained and well qualified personnel to exercise discretion, and respond to dynamic conditions. Although adaptation and initiative should always be encouraged, personnel must also be responsible for their actions, and be able to justify their decisions.
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APPENDIX - A

DRAFT CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE POLICY
(Proposed Policy Governing Operations)
5.00 **PURPOSE:**

To establish guidelines for deployment and operations at incidents involving civil disorder.

5.01 **SCOPE:**

This policy is applicable to all Fire & EMS personnel operating at incidents involving civil disorder.

5.02 **DEFINITIONS:**

1. **Civil Disorder / Disturbance:** The intentional disobedient behavior by a group of people in violation of public policy, laws or regulations, that results in some form of community disruption.

   **NOTE:** For the purpose of this policy, Civil Disorder, Civil Unrest and Civil Disturbance should all be considered interchangeable.

2. **Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert:** A Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert describes the Department’s state of operational readiness and may include the employment of all or part of SOP 3-4-5, Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert & Deployment.

3. **Police Field Force:** A grouping of specially trained and equipped police officers deployed into an area of disorder to regain order. This may include the use of chemical agents and physical force.

5.03 **RESPONSIBILITY:**

1. All Fire & EMS personnel are responsible for their personal conduct, and their familiarity with Department policies and procedures which address
such incidents.

2. **Company Officers** are responsible for the preparation of their station and company(s) when a "Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert" is declared, and for the operation of their company(s) at the tactical level when deployed.

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- **District Chiefs** are responsible for Fire & EMS incident management at the strategy level. The actions taken at such an incident will place the public's safety and the safety of Department personnel as the top priority. In the absence of the Chief or a Deputy Chief, the incident commander shall also function at the policy level, and have the authority to declare a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert, and order deployment.

4. **Chief or Deputy Chief** are responsible for declaring a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert, and for the overall Fire & EMS operation at such an incident whether on scene or at an off site Command Post. They shall also function at the policy level during a civil disturbance, and provide direction as to the level of commitment.

   A. If incident command is assumed by the Chief or Deputy Chief, they shall also function at the strategy level and be responsible for the overall safety of the public and Department personnel.

   B. If not physically at the scene but in contact with the Fire & EMS Operations Commander, the Chief or Deputy Chief shall provide general direction, and assist with policy decisions.

5.04 **POLICY:**

1. The Fire & EMS Department represents the interests of the City of Eugene as determined by its elected officials and executive managers. Although the Department and its resources will support the City in achieving its goals and objectives, the responsibility for maintaining order during periods of civil disorder remains a law enforcement responsibility and the police agencies trained and equipped to handle such an event.
2. Although the Fire & EMS Department's operational procedures may be modified during a civil disturbance, the mission and purpose of the Department does not change. The Department's strategic objectives are to provide for the protection of life and property.

3. Fire & EMS companies deployed at incidents involving civil disorder shall work within the procedures established in: SOP 3-4-5, Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert & Deployment Procedures.

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5.05 CIVIL DISTURBANCE TACTICAL ALERT:

1. The Chief, a Deputy Chief or their designee may declare a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert under the following conditions:
A. An active civil disturbance is in effect and the Police Department has either deployed, or is about to deploy to manage the event and regain control.

B. An active protest, demonstration or party are beginning to exhibit signs of a developing disturbance.

C. Law enforcement intelligence has provided information that a civil disturbance is likely, and the Police Department is preparing for a Field Force standby or deployment.

2. When a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert is declared the effected companies will be notified, and the initial geographical area of operation (AO), will be established. All on duty companies shall consult SOP 3-4-5, Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert & Deployment Procedures.

A. If a Task Force or Strike Team is to be established, the involved units will be identified, and the staging area will be established.

5.06 ACCEPTABLE INVOLVEMENT:

1. Command officers shall determine the appropriate level of personal protective equipment to be worn by Fire & EMS personnel, and coordinate all activities with on scene police command officers and city officials. Command officers shall also participate, when applicable, in any pre-incident briefings, and provide as much detail as possible to operating companies prior to incident deployment.

2. Command and company officers shall exercise caution and limit the exposure of personnel to violent situations when providing support.

3. The Department shall assist police with access problems, e.g., forcible entry, ladders, and elevating aerial platforms and devices as long as the use of such equipment does not place Department personnel in danger, and is in keeping with this policy.

4. The Department shall provide emergency medical care in secure areas to
any person(s) needing assistance. The Department shall also perform rescue, patient extraction, and protestors extrication services as needed and deemed safe by the Incident Commander, or Operations Branch if established.

5. The Department shall perform essential fire control and suppression activities in areas controlled by police or deemed safe for operation.

5.07 PROHIBITED INVOLVEMENT:

1. The use of hydraulic force applied from hose lines, appliances, and elevated streams for the purpose of crowd control shall be prohibited.

2. The use of Fire & EMS apparatus or equipment to block access or control crowd movement shall be prohibited, except as needed to establish treatment zones or safe working areas.

3. The use of physical force to control individuals beyond what is needed for self defense, or the assistance in the defense of other involved Fire & EMS personnel, or to control a combative patient during emergency medical treatment shall be avoided.

4. The application of chemical agent by Fire & EMS personnel to control crowds, or individuals shall be prohibited. This does not include the administration of chemical restraints such as Droperidol by paramedics for legitimate medical reasons.

5. Direct actions which unreasonably jeopardize the health, welfare, or safety of any person(s) at the incident scene shall be avoided.

6. Antagonistic or supportive behavior by Fire & EMS personnel toward people involved in the disturbance shall be prohibited.

5.07 PREPARATION:
1. Fire & EMS Command Officers should meet periodically with their Police Department counterparts to maintain positive relations, and ensure that there is an awareness and understanding of each agency’s civil disorder policies and procedures.

APPENDIX - B

DRAFT CIVIL DISTURBANCE RESPONSE PROCEDURES
(Proposed Procedures For Operations)
5.00 **PURPOSE:**

To establish procedures to be followed in the event of a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert or Deployment.

5.01 **RESPONSIBILITY:**

1. **The Eugene Police Department** will have the general responsibility and authority in all cases of civil disorder.

2. **All Fire & EMS Personnel** are responsible for following these procedures when a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert is declared, deployment ordered, or a company finds itself unknowingly in the midst of a civil disturbance.

3. **Company Officers** are responsible for preparing their company(s), and station if they are in an involved area, and a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert is declared, and for the appropriate tactical response if deployed into an area involved in a civil disturbance.

4. **District Chiefs** are responsible for the coordination of deployed companies at the strategic level, and shall assume either Incident Command, Fire & EMS Operations
5. Chief, a Deputy Chief, or Designee are responsible for declaring a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert and Deployment under the criteria established in: SOP 1-11-5, Civil Disorder Policy.

5.02 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS:

During a civil disturbance situation, chief and company officers are granted the flexibility of deviating from the operational guidelines established by policy and procedure in those situations where it is deemed to be in the best interest of safety of the involved personnel, and the Department's assets. Officers deviating from policy and procedure will be responsible for their decisions, and will be asked to justify their actions.

5.03 NOTIFICATION and INITIAL ACTION OPTIONS:

1. Notification to the Fire & EMS Department will generally come from one of the following:

   A. Police Captain in charge of Special Operations.
   B. On duty Police Watch Commander.
   C. Fire & EMS Dispatch. This method will most likely be used if there is little or no prior warning.

2. The Deputy Chief of the Field Operations Division, or in his/her absence, the on duty District Chief responsible for the effected area, will determine the level of action to be initially taken, and notify personnel accordingly. If the notification of the event occurs at the District Chief level, the District Chief shall notify the Deputy Chief of Field Operations who in turn shall notify the Chief and Technical Services Deputy Chief if warranted. Based on this initial information, one or more of the following initial actions may take place depending upon the situation.

   A. Notification of personnel stationed in the effected and surrounding area, and monitor the situation. All on duty medic units will also be notified in this
situation. The information included in the notification may include:

1) Type of disturbance.

2) Approximate number of people involved, if known.

3) Projected duration, if known.

4) Possible activities based on police intelligence, if available.

5) Area of operation (AO), and perimeter if established or known. And the direction the crowd is heading if movement is noted.

6) Police status and level of deployment or action.

7) Known hazards or special considerations that may effect personnel safety or Fire & EMS operations.

B. Notify all on duty personnel and declare a Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert.

C. Institute a move up of companies to increase deployment strength in the effected area.

D. Hire overtime to increase shift strength or request mutual aid standby at out lying stations vacated as a result of move up.

   1) Mutual aid companies will be deployed only as a last resort into an involved area.

E. Assign an additional operationally qualified chief officer to either back fill in the City, or to be assigned as Safety Officer to ride with the Task Force or Strike Team leader.

   1) During a Civil Disturbance Tactical Deployment, the primary job of the Safety Officer shall be to monitor the crowd.

F. Designate a staging area and deploy companies into a standby position to
form up into a Task Force or Strike Team.

5.04 CIVIL DISTURBANCE TACTICAL ALERT PROCEDURES:

1. APPARATUS PREPARATION:
   
   A. Place all small accessible outside equipment inside of apparatus compartments.
   
   B. Ensure that the hose bed cover is in place and secure.
   
   C. Use pre-connected hose lines for quick deployment and pick-up.
   
   D. Single company stations in an involved area may be moved up to another station or location. Once trapped in a station, it is very difficult to effect response out of quarters.

   D. Station Watch may be established at the discretion of the ranking chief officer in charge of the incident using two personnel from the Department's Technical Services Division, if the event occurs during business hours; police officers, if available; or overtime personnel.

   1) Station Watch personnel shall have portable radios or cellular telephones made available to them in addition to the station's hard wire telephone.

   2) Any attacks on the station shall be reported immediately through either 911 using a telephone, or Fire Dispatch using a radio.

   • Consideration shall be given to evacuating staffed apparatus from stations in the vicinity of the AO to prevent trapping of response resources by traffic gridlock or mass demonstrations.

3. PERSONAL PREPARATION:
A. Personnel shall shed their house uniform, if it is being worn at the time, and wear either t-shirts or sweat shirts, dependant upon weather conditions.

B. If the Civil Disturbance Tactical Alert occurs near a meal time, personnel should go ahead and eat and take care of other personal needs after their station and apparatus are in order.

C. Personnel shall monitor the situation by computer, television, or periodic updates from their chief officer or Dispatch.

5.05 CIVIL DISTURBANCE TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT PROCEDURES:

1. GENERAL GUIDELINES:

A. Personnel safety shall be the number one consideration.

1) Personnel shall use all available PPE as warranted by the incident or ordered by IC. If the use of tear gas or other chemical crowd control agents is anticipated, SCBAs or gas masks will be made available.

1. Crews shall deploy as a unit and maintain a high level of personnel accountability.

2. When deploying tactically, every effort will be made to complete tasks quickly, and communicate crew status and availability for reassignment. Upon completion of a task, the crew will remain with, or in their apparatus and be prepared to withdraw.

B. When responding into an involved area, units shall meet at a designated staging location as designated by the ranking fire officer, form up, and respond into the incident as either a Strike Team or Task Force.

1) At least two units shall respond in to an involved area together unless a special Extraction Medic Unit is established, staffed with at least three (3) personnel, and used to respond into reasonably controlled
areas, accompanied by a command unit, to pick up patients and remove them to a designated Treatment/Transportation location (generally the staging area).

2) Avoid responding into dead end or blocked streets with only one route in and out.

C. The Fire & EMS Incident Commander, Operations Branch Chief, if established, or Task Force/Strike Team Leader will determine if a Police Department escort is needed for response into an involved area. If so, the request shall go through either Dispatch, or the Fire Liaison Officer in the Police Command Post if established. It is recognized that this added level of security can in some instances provoke a violent response from a crowd.

1) If responding into an involved area at the request of police officers on scene, and without the aid of a police escort, personnel will ask for the following information:

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A) The exact nature of the problem? If problem is medical, the number, and severity of injuries to the patients. If the problem is fire related, determine what is burning?

B) Whether the area is secured?

C) What is the best route of travel into the problem? If the police are unsure of the specific route in, ask for the best direction of travel, e.g., "from the east, west, etc."

D. Although emergency lights may be used when responding into an involved area, use of audible warning devices such as sirens and air horns will be suspended when near a crowd. Turn off wig-wag headlights and strobes when operating on scene, they decrease fire fighter visibility.

E. The Fire & EMS Incident Commander, Operations Branch Chief, if established, or Task Force/Strike Team Leader will determine the appropriate
level of personal protective equipment to be worn. At a minimum, this equipment shall include head, eye and foot protection, and in most circumstances will consist of full fire suppression turn-outs.

1) Wildland helmets with goggles may be substituted for structural fire fighting helmets at the discretion of the company officer for non-fire responses.

J. Company officers may institute the withdraw from emergency situations if the situation poses an extraordinary threat to the safety of personnel. Operating companies shall withdraw together at the same time.

2. EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS):

A. MEDICAL EMERGENCIES INVOLVING MOBILE PATIENTS: When notified by police of a patient needing treatment in the involved area, it will be determined if they can be escorted outside of the area of operation to meet a medic unit. This will always be the preferred method for reaching a patient.

B. MEDICAL EMERGENCIES INVOLVING A SMALL NUMBER OF PATIENTS, IMMOBILE: An Extraction Medic Unit, staffed with a minimum of three (3) personnel, may be used when the involved location is determined to be reasonably secure.

1) In this situation, the unit goes in, employs a minimum amount of treatment and stabilization, and then removes the patient(s) to a secure Treatment and Transportation location (generally the staging area). At this location, another medic unit is used to treat and release, or treat and transport the patient to the hospital.

2) All civilian patients will be searched for weapons prior to placing them inside of a medic unit. This search should be conducted by a police officer if one is available.
3) If the patient is combative, a police officer will be asked to accompany the medic unit back to the Treatment and Transport area, and may then be asked to accompany the transport unit to the hospital if the patient is still uncooperative.

C. MASS CASUALTY INCIDENT (MCI): MCIs will be handled like all MCIs with the following exceptions:

1) Police will establish a secure area and an ingress/egress corridor, and apparatus will be used to maintain a secure Triage, Treatment, and Transportation area.

2) Fire & EMS personnel shall wear the designated level of personal protection when operating in the Area of Operation.

3. FIRE SUPPRESSION:

A. The initial fire suppression response into an involved area will be one chief officer, two engines, and one medic unit.

1) The initial response will be used to assess the problem, contain, confine and extinguish, if possible, or request and deploy additional companies as needed.

2) Truck companies will remain at the staging area until determined if they are absolutely needed, and if they can safely respond into the area. It is recognized that truck companies are less maneuverable than engine companies, and can become more easily trapped in an involved area.

B. Fire suppression tactics will involve exposure protection as the primary concern to minimize the potential for a conflagration. The second priority is to knock down and black out of fires from the exterior as quickly as possible with heavy streams using deck nozzles mounted on the apparatus, or pre-connected hand lines to maintain mobility.
1) Consideration will constantly be given to withdrawing personnel, apparatus and equipment.

2) Operations involving SCBA should be kept to a minimum.

C. Tank water should be used for small fires rather than a supply line. Consideration shall be given to the use of Class A foam to enhance extinguishment, penetration, and reduce overhaul needs. Refill water tank after withdrawing from the involved area of operation.

D. Keep crew together at all times and operate as close to the apparatus as possible. Crew members shall not operate alone.

E. The pump panel of the attack engine should be oriented towards the fire so that personnel are within visual range of one another, and the apparatus is between personnel and the crowd.

1) If police are available to assist, deploy them on the crowd side of the apparatus and use them to watch your back.

F. Keep hose lines at minimum length.

G. Do not perform salvage or overhaul.

H. When fire is blacked-out, pick up and withdraw from the area together as quickly and orderly as possible.

I. If units are attacked at the scene, they should be prepared to leave the involved area at once.

J. Two personnel shall remain at the apparatus used to pump at all times, and additional personnel may be assigned as the situation warrants. One person will be assigned to watch the crowd.

K. Avoid operating up in the air on ladders.
3. PROTESTOR EXTRICATION, POLICE ASSIST:

A. Fire and EMS personnel will assist police when requested, to extricate protestors who have secured themselves to fixed objects as a means of protest and societal disruption.

B. Prior to any extrication action, each protestor shall be searched for weapons. As this is a police function, Fire & EMS personnel should request assistance for the search from a police officer.

C. Prior to any extrication action, ask each protestor if they have the ability to detach themselves from the object. Explain the hazards associated with the extrication and attempt to gain compliance.

D. If the police are video taping the event, request that they video each extrication action, and verbalize each step you are taking to protect the protester. When the taping begins, again request that the protestor extricate themselves, if they refuse, explain the hazards associated with the extrication and verbalize the importance of cooperating with your directions to them.

NOTE: Remain professional in your conduct at all times. You never know who is listening or recording the event.

E. Use a blanket or tarp to protect the protester prior to using any type of cutting tool. Also watch out for the safety of unprotected police officers who are observing the extrication.

F. EXTRICATION TOOLS:

   1) HYDRAULIC CUTTING DEVICE:
      A) U-Shaped bicycle locks.
      B) Chains.
      C) Krypton pad locks, which can require up to 12,000 lbs of cutting force to break.
D) Hand cuffs. First check with the police on scene to see if they have a key that fits the lock.

2) BOLT CUTTERS:
   A) Wire cable made up of individual wire strands.
   B) Metal bands.

3) EMS SHEERS:
   A) Fabric.
   B) Nylon webbing and belts.
   C) Leather belts or strapping.

4) DO NOT ATTEMPT EXTRICATION IN THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS:
   A) Heavy gauge tubular metal sleeves with internal hand holds.
   B) Protestors secured aloft in trees.

APPENDIX - C

SURVEY INSTRUMENT
(Cover Letter and Survey Instrument)